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Department of Animal Sciences, University of Kentucky, Lexington 40546-0215
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Key Words: Agricultural Science • Ethics • Problem Analysis
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Introduction |
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highlights numerous contentious issues associated with our system of animal agriculture and argues that animal scientists should not only become educated about such issues, but also engage in activities that address these issues. Recent symposia on contemporary issues have focused on enhancing awareness of such issues. This symposium attempts to move us beyond awareness and toward resolution. The underlying assumption of this symposium is that some of the criticisms of animal agriculture are justified and therefore should be addressed. The individuals invited to participate in this symposium will illuminate some of these criticisms. The purpose of my paper is to provide a context for their discussions. In particular, I shall consider what it means to take on a critical perspective. To put this differently, my goal is to establish an intellectual framework for critically evaluating the system of animal agriculture that many of us take for granted.
What is a Critical Perspective?
This symposium is concerned with political conflicts dealing with the control of the reality in which we live. The central problem addressed by this session is reflected in the comments of Dale Spender (Spender, 1980).
"Difficulty arises when one group holds a monopoly on naming and is able to enforce its own particular bias on everyone, including those who do not share its view of the world. ...The dominant reality remains the reference point even for those of us who seek to transform it."
When this occurs, those who are placed at risk by the dominant reality are denied the means to articulate their plights, and their point of view is often overlooked and/or underemphasized. Without a critical evaluation of this dominant reality, there is little chance of addressing their concerns. This symposium is intended to offer insight into how we might engage in a critical questioning of the dominant reality perpetuated by those who occupy elite positions in animal agriculture. The reality in question here is the so-called social reality, that is, the numerous relationships that exist in society. With respect to animal agriculture, it seems appropriate to consider both the relationships among humans as well as relationships between humans and other animals.
This type of analysis is known as critique but has also been referred to as deconstruction (Frazier and Lacy, 1993). Through a critique, or deconstruction, of the dominant social reality, we can gain a critical perspective that illuminates how this reality can place some individuals at risk.
A Method for Critique
An approach to critiquing the dominant social reality of animal agriculture can be derived from the above discussion. First, it is important to clarify what I mean by a method of critique. I am not referring to a "method" as a specific, stepwise procedure analogous to a laboratory method for assaying a metabolite or a hormone. In this case, I use the term method as a manner of thinking. Although many theorists use this approach (Frazer and Lacey, 1993), a precise formula for carrying out this process seems elusive. This is not unlike the so-called scientific method. Scientists employ many scientific methods. What scientists share in their methodology is a systematic way of thinking about research problems.
Critique is a manner of thinking about the social reality. More precisely, this method involves the identification and critical evaluation of 1) the major assumptions underlying the social reality and 2) the discourse and practices that are derived from and support these assumptions. The major aim of critique is to identify the flaws or shortcomings associated with these foundational assumptions as well as any arguments that rely on them. Ultimately, such a method can provide a basis for reform.
The issue of sexual harassment can serve as an example of how critique can work (Frazer and Lacey, 1993). This is a particularly useful example because critique has been used by a number of feminists to develop a deep understanding of both the causes and consequences of sexual harassment. Sexual harassment can be defined as "sexual attentions in situations in which these are inappropriate and/or unwelcome, especially but not only when they are persistent (Frazer and Lacey, 1993)." As noted above, critique is a manner of thinking about an issue. With respect to the feminist critique of sexual harassment, thinking has focused on fundamental assumptions about what it means to be a man or woman, the roles of men and women in society, values that underlie sexual harassment, and the effects that these assumptions have on people’s lives. Some of the more notable assumptions are as follows: 1) that women do not have the right to determine when sexual attentions are appropriate, 2) that men and women relate to each other only in sexual ways, 3) that the nature of women is such that they sexualize nonsexual environments, 4) that male sexuality is uncontrollable and insatiable and is triggered whenever men encounter women, and 5) that women do not have the right or power to enforce and institutionalize alternative forms of sexuality (e.g., equality, respect, friendship).
An important feature of critique is that this method relies heavily on personal experiences. In other words, the social significance of various assumptions, discourse, and practices comes to be understood through a diverse array of personal experiences. In the case of sexual harassment, insight into how assumptions about gender affect the lives of people has been derived from the perspectives of women who have been sexually harassed, perpetrators of sexual harassment, and those who deal with the issue of sexual harassment in the work place. When the views of those who have been sexually harassed are considered, it becomes clear that sexual harassment is not a harmless expression of human nature. Rather the practice is revealed to be a harmful, antisocial behavior that should be severely questioned and rejected. Obviously, addressing problems associated with sexual harassment requires a set of assumptions about people and social life that differ from the ones that prevailed when sexual harassment was tolerated. In fact, reform can arise only from such alternative assumptions.
Why Take a Critical Perspective?
Some animal scientists may ask why we should engage in a critique of animal agriculture. After all, could not such questioning encourage or facilitate the demise of animal agriculture? One way to address this question is rooted in ethics and is based on two important assumptions. The first assumption is that our current system of animal agriculture is harmful to some humans and some animals (Cheeke, 1999). Thompson (1999) argues that criticisms of animal agriculture arise from individuals who view themselves as being placed at risk by current policies and practices. The second assumption is that these risks or harms are morally significant. Therefore, we have a moral obligation to not only understand how animal agriculture can be harmful, but also to work to develop strategies that address these harms.
Social Reality, Power, and Harm
Before we can consider how to initiate a critique of animal agriculture, it is necessary to understand how the dominant social reality can be harmful to individuals. First, it is important to understand that the networks of relationships that define the social reality are associated with particular power structures. Social relations are a prerequisite for the exercise of power, and power reinforces certain social relations. For purposes of clarification, I view power as the ability to make someone do something, or to prevent someone from doing something. This influence over people’s actions is affected via the distribution of basic goods and liberties.
Power itself is not necessarily a problem. Power is merely a characteristic of relationships. We live with many power structures that are not usually harmful, such as relationships between parent and child, teacher and student, department chair and faculty member. In many of these cases, power relations do not restrict access to basic goods and liberties. Our concern is with cases where power is distributed in ways that cause harm. A parent-child relationship is not harmful when a parent limits a child’s consumption of candies but becomes harmful when the parent restricts the child’s access to adequate nutrition or subjects the child to physical or mental abuse. These are examples of tangible harms. There are also less-tangible harms that are worthy of our concern. For example, a department chair who promotes attitudes and policies that undervalue teaching may contribute to a feeling of alienation or low self-worth among faculty members with heavy teaching responsibilities.
As mentioned above, the focus of critique is the dominant social reality. What determines the social reality? Or what specifically is the basis of critique? One view is that discourse and practice determine the dominant social reality. Discourse can be thought of as a set of ideas. Since our ideas exist in the form of language, discourse can be understood as sets of interrelated sentences. The ideas (sentences) that make up discourse are legitimized and perpetuated by various social institutions. For example, the idea that competition enhances performance is embraced and perpetuated by numerous institutions, including athletic organizations, schools, granting agencies, and our economic system. The language associated with this idea shapes how we interact with each other, that is, as competitors.
Practice refers to human action that is socially based, and supported by various formal and informal institutions. For example, the fact that we make presentations fully clothed is in part due to informal rules of etiquette, as well as laws that regulate public nudity.
Discourse and practice are intertwined. Ideas about the world govern how we interact in society, whereas our actions in society influence how we think about the world we live in. The social reality also feeds back to reinforce discourse and practice. This may be why it is frequently so difficult to bring about social change. For example, at one time it was widely assumed that because women tend to take on nurturing roles in society (e.g., mothers, nurses, secretaries) they are not qualified for positions (e.g., corporate executives, politicians) that require other traits (e.g., independence or aggressiveness). In this case, ideas about femininity and practices that keep women in certain roles determine the social location of women (i.e., the social reality), and the location of women in society in turn reinforces these ideas and practices.
It is clear that the social reality of animal agriculture is associated with a particular discourse and set of practices. Note that the previous logo of the ASAS was "the scientific voice of animal agriculture." The current logo, "The leading source of new knowledge and perspective in animal science," seems to assert that, within the discipline of animal science, the best information is science-based. Examination of popular magazines dealing with livestock production supports the idea that the discourse associated with animal agriculture is primarily scientific. This "scientific voice" carries quite a bit of weight in animal agriculture. Livestock management is now based on the notion of a "scientific livestock production." According to this view, the production and processing of animals for food should be based more on objective scientific principles than on tradition and personal experience. These ideas are related to numerous practices that determine the type of research conducted at universities and government agencies, the ways livestock are managed and processed, how students and farmers are educated, and how livestock and the products that support livestock production are marketed. Together, this discourse and these practices define various roles for individuals and place them into webs of relationships with one another. A few of these relationships include those between producer and animal, student and teacher, scientist and layperson, executive and factory worker, producer and consumer. These webs of relationships and the political structures associated with them reinforce discourse and practices. The relationship between a university extension specialist and a producer illustrates this point. The extension specialist occupies the role of an expert, whose job is to impart science-based information to the livestock producer. This relationship and its associated power structure (the extension specialist is more likely to influence the actions of the producer than vice versa) reinforces the idea of a scientific livestock production along with a variety of practices, including research, extension meetings, publishing extension bulletins, and so on. This association between discourse, practices, and the social reality can be viewed as the proverbial box that we are so often encouraged to think outside of. So, "thinking outside the box" is what critique is all about.
The Dominant Reality of Animal Agriculture
In the remaining portion of this paper, I should like to set the stage for the remaining presentations. More specifically, I will characterize some noteworthy assumptions underlying the social reality that currently dominates our system of animal agriculture and briefly consider how these presuppositions affect some humans and other animals.
How does one go about characterizing the dominant social reality of animal agriculture? One common approach is to examine texts. Recall that one of the defining features of social reality is discourse, that is, a set of ideas or interrelated sentences legitimized and perpetuated by social institutions. Textbooks are convenient sources of such ideas because they typically embrace the most widely accepted views of a particular discipline. In addition, most textbooks attempt to place a particular discipline into some social context, such as how the discipline came to be developed and how knowledge produced by the discipline relates to the lives of humans. With this in mind, I examined the first chapters of several introductory animal science textbooks with the purpose of gleaning characteristics of the discourse embraced by the animal science community.
The authors of each of these textbooks devote a significant portion of the introductory chapters to characterizing the relationship between humans and other animals. In this relationship, livestock and companion animals serve the needs and interests of humans. Pond and Pond (2000) note that "animals serve people in diverse ways, including the production of milk, wool, and eggs; service as seeing-eye dogs; in rodent control; in herding livestock; guarding property; and giving trustworthy companionship." Cunningham and Acker (2001) reiterate this point of view stating that "the domestication of animals has contributed greatly to humanity. Their major role has been in providing a dependable source of food and fiber. Modern-type animals of today provide other benefits and pleasures to people throughout the world." Campbell, Kenealy, and Campbell (1985) are perhaps the most emphatic, asserting that "the foremost reason for maintaining our animal populations is to provide a nutritious and desirable form of food for human consumption." According to these authors, the main reason nonhuman animals should exist is to serve the needs and tastes of humans.
Clearly, these texts are describing a conceptual framework for understanding the world, and one of the most important concepts in this view is that nonhuman animals exist to serve humans. It is important to highlight the political nature of this relationship. Humans are the ones with the power. We "domesticated" animals for our own use, and we decide how they should be used. Clearly, nonhuman animals occupy roles that are subordinate to those of humans.
What is most striking about the discourse of contemporary animal science texts is that it is almost identical to what emerged 400 yr ago during the birth of the Modern era (sixteenth through eighteenth centuries). Ideas of men like Francis Bacon were particularly influential in constructing contemporary society and illustrate the Modern conceptualization of how humans and animals should interact. In New Atlantis, an account of a utopian society, Bacon describes Solomon House, a research institution devoted to the production of scientific knowledge that allows humans to control nature for their own benefit. In one section, Bacon describes how nonhuman animals are studied for the benefit of society (Merchant, 1983).
"We have also parks and enclosures of all sorts of beasts and birds, which we use not only for view or rareness, but likewise for dissections and trials, that thereby we may take light what may be wrought upon the body of man. . . We also try all poisons and other medications upon them as well of [surgery] and physic."
Like the authors of animal science textbooks, Bacon assumes that nonhuman animals exist only to serve the interests and needs of humans.
Critiquing Animal Agriculture
The texts of Bacon and animal scientists reveal important fundamental assumptions about nature and how humans should relate to it. These assumptions can serve as the basis for a critique of the dominant reality that shapes animal agriculture. There are several types of assumptions to consider in this kind of analysis: metaphysical and epistemological.
Metaphysical assumptions deal with the nature of being and the origin and structure of the cosmos. Two important metaphysical assumptions associated with the Modern view (i.e., the view expressed by Bacon and embraced by many animal scientists) are 1) that humans are separate from nature and 2) that nature is made up of parts that are rationally ordered, causally interrelated, and function in accordance with universal rules and laws (Merchant, 1983). Because this view relies on the metaphor of a machine, this perspective has become known as "the mechanical view of nature." An assumption related to these metaphysical assumptions is epistemological, or having to do with knowledge. According the Modern view, nature can be understood by analyzing it into parts from which information can be extracted as sense data. Therefore, humans can have knowledge of the rational structure of nature if they employ appropriate analytical methods (Merchant, 1983). These assumptions provide the rationale for scientific research on nonhuman animals, which, according to the Modern view, are part of nature (Merchant, 1983; Adams, 1993). By employing appropriate analytical tools (i.e., scientific methodology), humans can have knowledge of the laws governing the function of nonhuman animals.
It should be noted that the metaphysical and epistemological assumptions supporting the idea that humans can have knowledge of nature provide no insight into why humans should investigate and control nature. Or, to put this another way, why is the control of nature right or good? This is a question about ethics. An answer to such a question requires a moral argument. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss specific moral arguments that address why humans should investigate and manipulate nature. It is sufficient to note only that there is an important moral assumption underlying the Modern or mechanical view of the world, that is, only humans have moral standing. Nature, including nonhuman animals, is morally significant only insofar as it can be made useful for humans. This assumption cleared the way for the control, or domination, of nature and has characterized Western culture for the past 400 yr (Merchant, 1983).
The worldview or conceptual framework I just described is familiar to all of us. Most people who do animal science research, raise livestock, and develop and market products used in livestock production embrace the idea that we seek to control nature in order to benefit the human condition. We take this view and its underlying assumptions for granted and find it difficult to imagine a different way of understanding the world. Because of this, many of us may ask, what’s wrong with this view? Or, more specifically, how does this view cause harm and to whom? We might begin addressing these questions by considering ways in which certain problems associated with animal agriculture are linked to Modern ideas (discourse) concerning how the world is structured, what it means to be human, and what constitutes ethical behavior. Such an analysis will reveal that the dominant view in animal agriculture favors the experiences and interests of certain individuals sometimes at the expense of others.
One assumption that has been the focus of critique is that humans are separate from and superior to nature. Although the mechanical view of nature has been predominant in Western culture, a more organic view predominated before the scientific revolution and has gained popularity during the late twentieth century (Merchant, 1983). Whereas the mechanical view conceptualizes humans as masters of a machine called nature, an organic view conceptualizes nature as a living organism consisting of interrelated parts (organs), none of which can function independently. Humans and their societies are considered part of this living organism. Michael Pollan (2002) notes that the language of the mechanical view "divides the world into active subjects and passive objects." We learn to view ourselves as active subjects who act upon a passive nature. For example, using language from the previously mentioned textbooks, we humans "domesticated" animals to make them more useful to us. The subject/object dichotomy is blurred in the organic view, wherein "every subject is also an object, every object a subject (Pollan, 2002)." Pollan (2002) views agriculture not only as something people do to nature, but also as something nature does to people. From a coevolutionary standpoint, humans did not domesticate certain plants and animals. Rather, these species coevolved with humans. These plants and animals selected humans to perpetuate their genes just as much as we humans selected them to fulfill our needs and desires.
Difficulties associated with making meaningful distinctions between humans and nature also have important implications regarding the moral status of nonhuman animals. Although it is clear that there are numerous physical differences between human and nonhuman animals, several theorists have argued that such differences are not morally relevant and that nonhuman animals should be considered part of the moral community based on traits that they share with humans, that is, that they can feel pain or that they have intrinsic value (Rollin, 1981; Regan, 1983; Singer, 1993). Few people would deny that livestock are routinely subjected to a variety of physical and psychological harms. Although most animal scientists would agree that livestock should not be treated cruelly, few accept the notion that we humans have a moral obligation to livestock. Thus, there is little motivation within the animal science community to investigate and alleviate the harms associated with routine animal production practices. It seems that accepting the view that nonhuman animals are morally considerable is a prerequisite for critically assessing current livestock production practices.
A critique of animal agriculture might also focus on the assumption that all humans are the same in certain essential ways. Specifically, this metaphysical assumption deals with the ontology of person, or what it means to be a human being. According to the Modern view, all humans are independent, autonomous, and rational. Thus, an understanding of nature is possible for all humans as long as they use appropriate analytical techniques. Typically, scientific methods are thought to be the appropriate techniques for understanding nature. Those who do not achieve this understanding are thought to be incapable of using these tools or simply lack the desire or motivation to do so. Thus, those who fail to understand the world in terms of a scientific discourse are frequently thought of as irrational (i.e., subhuman). Note that critics of industrial livestock production are typically portrayed by animal scientists as social misfits who are overly emotional, and/or ignorant. Whatever the basis of their beliefs (e.g., political, moral, religious), critics of the livestock industry have the right to not only express their views, but also to choose what type of animal agriculture they want to support. Ignoring their concerns and insisting that they accept only a scientific point of view promotes a scientific fascism.
One alternative way of conceptualizing humans is to acknowledge that humans exist in, and are defined by, webs of relationships, and that an individual’s location in society shapes what he or she understands about the world. Referring to the case of sexual harassment, it is clear that what one understands about sexual harassment is dependent on whether one is the harasser, the one who is harassed, or the one who deals with sexual harassment cases. Likewise, we should expect that executives in a vertically integrated swine production company have a different understanding of pig production than small-scale hog farmers or citizens whose homes are located adjacent to intensive swine farms. Moreover, it is also important to understand that these people exist in complex webs of relationships with each other and with other individuals, and that these relationships have associated with them power structures that influence access to basic goods and liberties. For example, the heads of large corporations typically have greater means to influence public policy (teams of attorneys, lobbyists, public relations specialists) than ordinary citizens. Because of this, it is often difficult to ascertain the perspectives of less-powerful groups.
To Whom Shall We Turn for Insight?
In the above discussion, I have outlined a method for critiquing animal agriculture and have offered several areas on which such a critique might focus. The problem with such an approach arises from the fact that it is often difficult to critically question what is taken for granted. This begs the question, to whom shall animal scientists turn for insight into the problems of animal agriculture? As Thompson (1999) points out, insight into the many contentious issues associated with animal science should come from more than those who are considered leaders in agriculture research, policy, and production. If we are to illuminate the harms incurred by our present system, we should consult those who have not benefited from and/or those who are placed at risk by this system.
We might turn to nonhuman animals for insight. I am not suggesting that we can become like Dr. Doolittle and "talk to the animals." Rather, I am suggesting that we continue to use scientific methods to understand animals but ask different kinds of questions, based on different metaphysical assumptions about the nature of nonhuman animals. Such restructuring may involve posing different kinds of questions within traditional research areas and developing new areas of research. For example, we might assume that nonhuman animals are sentient creatures (not production units) who are worthy of moral consideration, and focus our attentions on understanding them, not to make them efficient machines but to manage them in humane ways that allow them to actualize their natures (Rollin, 1981). This might involve new research paradigms within nutrition, genetics, and physiology, as well as new research areas, such as agricultural ecology.
We might also turn to workers in the various industries of animal agriculture. For example, workers in the meat-packing industry who have suffered grave injuries but have not received adequate medical treatment and/or compensation for their suffering. We might consult with people whose loved ones have died from eating foods tainted with E. coli or other pathogens. We might ask peasant farmers whose access to limited resources is diminished or whose cultures are threatened due to the industrialization of livestock production in developing nations. Finally, we might turn to our own students and colleagues. For example, the young women who experience sexual harassment during summer internships in the food-processing industries, or female and minority colleagues who are reluctant to complain about sexist and racists attitudes because they fear reprisals, or who experience burn out because they are expected to represent the views of all women and/or minorities on countless committees.
We usually cringe at the mention of these issues. Our response is best described as insular, dismissive, insensitive, and fearful. We often view complainers as overly emotional and/or irrational and conclude that their concerns are not worthy of our full attention. Do we actually believe that such people are not worthy of our consideration? I certainly hope not. Perhaps our reactions reflect our lack of experience in dealing with such problems. Perhaps the ideas and practices that define our reality reinforce an ideological framework that makes it difficult for us to understand, let alone address, these issues. Whereas these may be reasons for our behavior, they in no way excuse our behavior. As I stated earlier, as moral agents we have an obligation to understand and address the harms resulting from the ideas and practices we embrace and perpetuate.
In the papers that follow, each author takes on a critical perspective of animal agriculture. Although the details of their approaches differ, each of these individuals draws upon their personal experiences to question some of the fundamental assumptions of animal agriculture. In my view, many of their criticisms are directed toward a mechanical view of nature. Hodges (2003) points out that some of our attempts to dominate and control nature have had devastating consequences and have eroded the credibility of animal scientists. Beck and Swanson (2003) question the assumption that all humans are essentially the same and argue that one’s social location and embodiment also shape our social realities. They go on to emphasize the importance incorporating diverse life experiences into scientific research. Cuomo (2003) seems critical of the mechanistic view and explores how animal scientists might develop a new ethic that extends the moral boundaries to include nonhuman animals. Finally, Weber-Neilson and Bergfeld (2003) relate their own life experiences in animal agriculture to the criticisms raised by the other authors.
I hope this symposium and similar activities help us develop the vision to understand the shortcomings of our current system, reveal approaches for addressing these shortcomings, and instill in us the moral courage for taking action to correct them.
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2 This symposium was developed by WCC 204 Regional Committee on Animal Bioethics and was sponsored by Elanco Animal Health, ASAS Foundation, and European Association for Animal Production.
3 Correspondence—phone: 859-257-7512; fax: 859-257-3412; E-mail: kkschi1{at}uky.edu.
Received for publication October 16, 2002. Accepted for publication September 6, 2003.
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